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COMMENTS 
CAN THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCT? 
THE I.R.C. SECTION 7430 FEE RECOVERY 
CONTROVERSY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) takes an unrea-
sonable position regarding liability for past income tax, a tax-
payer may find him or herself in a double bind. He or she may 
find that it is less expensive to simply concede the alleged liabil-
ity than to defend against it. The IRS has the power to set in 
motion draconian collection measures if the taxpayer fails to 
take immediate defensive action. l Therefore the taxpayer is 
forced to either concede or enter into the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice's lengthy and expensive administrative appeals process.2 
When a tax professional is hired to represent the taxpayer 
in the appeal, fees are added and costs continue to climb. Never-
theless, when the taxpayer finally files suit to resolve the dis-
puted liability, he or she may find the result disillusioning. De-
pending upon the court and jurisdiction in which the suit is 
The author would like to thank Karen L. Hawkins of Taggart & Hawkins, San Fran-
cisco, California, for her expertise and assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1. For an explanation of Internal Revenue Service collection measures see M. SALTZ-
MAN, IRS Practice And Procedure, 14-1 - 14-45 (1981 & Supp. 1987). The Internal Reve-
nue Service is the only creditor in the United States which may attach a putative 
debtor's property and begin collection without first obtaining a court order. Thus in the 
tax debt situation, payment comes before defense, and the burden of proof, ordinarily 
borne by the creditor, is shifted to the taxpayer/debtor. [d. at 14-4. 
2. For an extensive discussion on Internal Revenue Service administrative appeals 
procedures, see M. SALTZMAN, supra note I, at Chapters 8 (The Examination Function) 
and 9 (The Appeals Function) (1981 & Supp. 1987). 
371 
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filed, the taxpayer may not be able to recover the fees and costs 
incurred in defending against any unreasonable position taken 
by the Service.3 In some jurisdictions, the courts have, in effect, 
held that the IRS can adopt an unreasonable position, force a 
taxpayer through the administrative appeals process and then 
concede without incurring liability for the taxpayer's fees and 
costs once a legal action is filed.' 
This result is currently possible due to the controversy sur-
rounding the interpretation of Internal Revenue Code section 
7430 (hereinafter section 7430).11 As originally enacted in 1982, 
3. The Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as the 
Tax Court, have interpreted fee recovery statutes narrowly and have awarded few litiga-
tion costs to prevailing taxpayers. See infra text accompanying notes 118-155. See also, 
Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (taxpayer's petition for 
fees pursuant to IRC section 7430 denied); Ewing v. Heye, 803 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(same); Walsh v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5370 (D. Minn. 1985) (same); Con-
tini v. United States, 55 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 419 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (same); Brazil v. United 
States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5707 (D. Or. 1984) (same); Zielinski v. United States, 54 
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5132 (D. Minn. 1984) (same); Eidson v. United States, 53 A.F.T.R.2d 
(P-H) 841 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (same). 
In contrast, the First and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal, as well as many of the 
district courts, have interpreted fee recovery statutes broadly and have been more in-
clined to award taxpayers fees in the face of the government's unreasonable conduct. See 
infra text accompanying notes 49-88. See also, Powell v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385 
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding the administrative position immediately prior to litigation is 
subject to scrutiny for reasonableness); Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(holding that governmental conduct throughout the administrative process should be ex-
amined); Finney v. Roddy, 617 F.Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1985) (same); Roggeman v. United 
States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119473 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (same); Rosenbaum v. Internal 
Revenue Service, 615 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Va. 1984) (same); Penner v. United States, 584 
F.Supp. 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (same); Hallam v. Murphy, 586 F.Supp. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1983) 
(same). For a general discussion of the "American Rule" of fee shifting and its progres-
sion in tax litigation, see Comment, Award of Attorney Fees in Tax Litigation, 19 VAL. 
U.L. REV. 153 (1984). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 118-155. See also Baker v. Commissioner, 787 
F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding the court may only consider the reasonable-
ness of the government's position in the civil proceeding, not in the underlying adminis-
trative procedure); Ewing v. Heye 803 F.2d at 613 (same); Walsh, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 
at 5370 (same); Contini, 55 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 419 (same); Brazil, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 
at 5707 (same); Zielinski, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5132 (same); Eidson, 53 A.F.T.R.2d 
(P-H) at 841 (same). 
5. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (amended by the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-514, § 1551(a)-(g), 1152(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752-53) was passed as part of the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-248, (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 
7430 (Supp. 1985) (amended 1986)) and provided in pertinent part: 
Awarding of court costs and certain fees. 
In the case of any civil proceeding which is -
(1) brought' by or against the United States in connection 
with the determination, collection or refund of any tax, inter-
2
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section 7430 provided for the award of attorneys' fees and costs6 
to a taxpayer in a case brought against the United States when 
the taxpayer had "substantially prevail[ed]"7 and the govern-
ment's "position ... in the civil proceeding was unreasonable, .. 
. ."8 The difficulty in interpretation stems from the discrepancy 
between the statute's language and its legislative history.9 
Prior to the passage of section 7430, a taxpayer who pre-
vailed in a tax case in a district court could petition for fees and 
costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2412(d)(1)(A), the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act (hereinafter EAJA).lo EAJA mandated that 
est or penalty under this title, and 
(2) brought in a court of the United States, (including the 
Tax Court and the United States Claims Court), the prevail-
ing party may be awarded a judgment for reasonable litigation 
costs incurred in such proceeding. 
7430(c)(2)(A). The term "prevailing party" means any 
party to any proceeding described in [7430(a») ... which -
(i) establishes that the position of the United States in 
the civil proceeding was unreasonable, and 
(ii) (I) has substantially prevailed with respect to the 
amount in controversy, or 
(II) has substantially prevailed with respect to the 
most significant issue or set of issues presented (emphasis 
added). 
The first portion of this article deals with cases which were decided under § 7430 
prior to its amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Therefore all references to § 
7430 are to the prior statute unless otherwise indicated. For a discussion of the effects of 
this amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 182-194. 
6. Section 7430 includes reasonable attorneys' fees within the term "costs." 26 
U.S.C. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 1986). 
7. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i)(l) (Supp. 1986) (amended by the 1986 TRA see 
supra note 5). To be considered a "prevailing party" under the statute, the taxpayer 
must first have substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy or as to 
the main issue in the suit. [d. Second, the taxpayer must prove that the government's 
position was unreasonable. [d. This two-pronged definition of "prevailing party" elimi-
nates the presumption that the taxpayer is automatically eligible for recovery of costs if 
the United States loses the case. See H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 11 
(1981) ; 127 CONGo REC. 32070, 32077 (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 404). 
Congress intended that the government "should not necessarily be penalized for the rea-
sonable pursuit of debatable tax issues. Tax administration would be ineffective if the 
Government conceded all close cases to the taxpayer in order to avoid payment of fee 
awards." Description of Law and Bills Relating to Awards of Attorney's Fees in Tax 
Cases, Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1984). 
8. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985) (26 U.S.C. § 7430 is referred to herein-
after as I.R.C. § 7430). 
9. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text. 
10. Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified in scattered United States 
Code Sections, including Titles 5, 28, and 48). EAJA was enacted to expand the liability 
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courts award fees and costs to the prevailing taxpayer if the gov-
ernment's position was not "substantially justified."ll 
When Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, it added section 7430 intending it as the con-
trolling statute for attorneys' fee awards in all tax cases, regard-
less of the forum chosen.12 EAJA was never applicable to cases 
brought in the United States Tax Court because EAJA, as a Ti-
tle 28 statute, pertained exclusively to courts established pursu-
ant to Article III of the United States Constitution. IS The 
United States Tax Court was established under Article I of the 
Constitution. a Therefore, a taxpayer who sued in a Federal dis-
trict court or the United States Claims Court could recover fees 
pursuant to EAJA, but a taxpayer who sued in the Tax Court 
could not. lll Congress intended section 7430 to remedy this ineq-
uity and provide for "one set of rules [to] apply to awards of 
litigation costs in tax cases whether the action is brought in a 
U.S. district court, the Court of Claims, or the U.S. Tax 
Court."16 
Section 7430 provides/7 in general, that in any civil tax pro-
ceeding against the United States, a prevailing party, other than 
of the United States for attorneys' fees and other expenses in all governmental adminis-
trative proceedings and civil actions. In this way Congress intended to encourage citizens 
with legitimate causes of action to litigate against the United States regardless of their 
financial circumstances. Any citizen who prevails in a dispute with any official or agency 
of the government may petition the court for fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (e)(2)(C). 
If the government cannot prove that its position was substantially justified, the court 
must award the fees unless special circumstances make the award unjust. H.R. REP. No. 
120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4-8 (1985). 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1987). Amended Aug. 5 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D». See also H.R. REP. 
No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. supra note 10, at 11. 
12. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 
Stat. 324, 572-74 (1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7430 (Supp. 1985»; see also 
H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
13. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 
(1982) (bankruptcy courts are non-Article III courts and therefore Title 28 is not appli-
cable). See also Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir.), 
cert denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966) (holding that the tax court is a non-Article III court and 
instead is a Article I legislative court). See also H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
14. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 12 n.1. 
15. See supra note 13. 
16. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
17. I.R.C. § 7430 was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See supra note 5. 
The current dollar limitation for attorneys' fee awards under § 7430 is $75.00 per hour. 
For a discussion of the changes made in § 7430 by the TRA, See infra note 183. 
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the United States, may be awarded reasonable litigation costS.18 
A "prevailing party" as defined by section 7430, is a party who 
has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in contro-
versy19 or as to the most significant issue[s] presented.20 Addi-
tionally, the prevailing party must have established that the 
"position of the United States in the civil proceeding was unrea-
sonable."21 A costs award under section 7430 includes reasonable 
court costs, attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and any neces-
sary studies, engineering reports, tests or projects.22 
The section's legislative history reveals that it was added to 
the tax code to "deter abusive actions or overreaching by the 
Internal Revenue Service and [to] enable individual taxpayers to 
vindicate their rights regardless of individual circumstances."23 
This statement demonstrates a recognition of the power the IRS 
wields and its potential for abuse. It also demonstrates Congres-
sional awareness of the comparatively ineffective position occu-
pied by a taxpayer facing the IRS bureaucracy. The legislative 
history, however, makes it clear that section 7430 was not 
designed to open the floodgates for fee recovery from the IRS.24 
To provide some protection against a perceived flood of frivolous 
claims, Congress limited the awarding of fees under section 7430 
to those cases where the government acted "unreasonably."211 In 
contrast, to recover fees under EAJA, the government's conduct 
must be "not substantially justified."26 Additionally, Congress 
placed the taxpayer suing under section 7430 at a disadvantage 
by imposing the burden of proving the unreasonableness of the 
government's position upon the taxpayer.27 EAJA places on the 
government the affirmative burden of proving that its conduct 
was substantially justified.28 
18. I.R.C. § 7430(a). Awards under § 7430 before its 1986 amendment were limited 
to $25,000. I.R.C. § 7430(B)(1). 
19. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(a)(ii)(I) (Supp. 1985). 
20. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(a)(ii)(II) (Supp. 1985). 
21. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985). See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 
11. 
22. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1) (Supp. 1985). 
23. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. See also I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985). 
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e)(3) (Supp. 1987). 
27. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985). 
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1) (Supp. 1987). 
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As another safeguard to keep claims from proliferating, the 
legislation requires that a taxpayer suing for fees must have "ex-
hausted the administrative remedies" available before he or she 
is eligible for recovery.29 This requirement is designed to en-
courage taxpayers to resolve tax disputes without litigation.80 
The administrative appeals process, however, is lengthy, compli-
cated and vulnerable to abuse by IRS agents.81 Because of the 
complexity and intimidating nature of the appeals procedure, 
many taxpayers obtain professional assistance. Nevertheless, the 
Ways and Means Committee, in its report on section 7430, 
stated that: 
The committee intends that the costs of pre-
paring and filing the petition or complaint which 
commences a civil tax action be the first of any 
recoverable attorney's fees. Fees paid or incurred 
for the services of an attorney during the admin-
istrative stages of the case could not be recover-
able under an award of litigation costs.B2 
Given the committee's stated intent that section 7430 "de-
ter abus[e] [and] overreaching"88 by the IRS, it is difficult to 
understand this apparent prohibition against awarding attor-
neys' fees for services performed while in the administrative ap-
peals process.8• The abuse and harassment which section 7430 
was enacted to deter is more likely to occur during the adminis-
trative process811 and, may be what ultimately causes taxpayers 
29. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (Supp. 1985). See also H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 13. 
30. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at 14. 
33. [d. at 11. 
34. See I.R.C. § 7430 (b)(2) (Supp. 1985); H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
35. The committee implicitly recognized this fact when it presented the factors to 
be taken into account when a court is considering awarding fees: 
(1) whether the government used the costs and expenses of 
litigation against its position to extract concessions from the 
taxpayer that were not justified under the circumstances of 
the case, (2) whether the government pursued the litigation 
against the taxpayer for purposes of harassment or embarrass-
ment, or out of political motivation, and (3) such other factors 
as the court finds relevant. 
H.R. REP. No. 404 supra note 7, at 12. 
While these particular abuses could conceivably occur after the filing of the civil 
action, the most likely time the IRS is going to "extract concessions" or unreasonably 
6
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to file suit. Given a literal reading of the committee report, ei-
ther the only abuses which can be punished are those occurring 
after an action is filed, or there are contradictions in the intent, 
goals and requirements of section 7430. 
II. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS 
The ambiguities present in section 7430's legislative history 
have made judicial interpretation a difficult task. Therefore, no 
consistent interpretation has occurred to date.36 The First, Fifth 
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals37 have rejected the notion 
that the IRS is not accountable for unreasonable conduct which 
occurs prior to "litigation." They have found it to be unaccept-
able and contrary to legislative intent.38 Thus, some courts have 
held that the pre litigation conduct of the IRS can be considered 
in fee awards.39 This approach is consistent with the legislative 
intent to deter abuse, because abuses can occur at the adminis-
trative leve1.40 
In contrast, the Eleventh and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals have held that pre litigation conduct may 
not be considered when awarding fees. 41 These courts support 
their position with a strict interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage and the above-quoted passage from the committee 
"pursue" the litigation for harassment purposes, is during settlement negotiations, prior 
to the filing of the suit. See Comment, Tax Litigation and Attorney's Fees: Still a Win-
Lose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 486 (1984) (discussing the committee's suggested 
factors to be taken in account when awarding fees). Such actions would force taxpayers 
to settle their dispute at the administrative level to avoid the cost and aggravation or 
embarrassment of litigating against the government. H.R. REP. No. 404 supra note 7, at 
12. 
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See infra text accompanying notes 37-
42. 
37. Powell v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding the administra-
tive position immediately prior to litigation is subject to scrutiny for reasonableness); 
Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that governmental conduct 
throughout the administrative process should be examined); Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839 
F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that prelitigation administrative conduct should be 
examined for reasonableness). 
38. [d. See infra text accompanying notes 49-88. 
39. See supra note 37. 
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
41. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ewing v. Heye, 803 
F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986). See also supra note 3. 
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report.·2 
The area which may generate the most controversy when 
dealing with section 7430 is the "last known address" case sce-
nario.·8 The last known address situation appears when the IRS 
attempts to notify a taxpayer of an alleged deficiency by mailing 
a statutory deficiency notice to an address where the taxpayer 
neither lives nor receives mail.·· The taxpayer never receives the 
notice and the statutory time to respond runs out.·Ii Thus in last 
known address cases the statutory notices fail to reach the tax-
payer and the IRS begins collection without the taxpayer ever 
being notified of the alleged deficiency.·& When the taxpayer 
learns of the alleged deficiency, collection efforts have already 
begun, and the taxpayer's only options are to file suit asking for 
an injunction to halt the collection procedures or to file a Tax 
Court petition.·7 Because the taxpayer never knew about the ad-
ministrative proceedings, he or she never attempted to exhaust 
the administrative remedies. Therefore, the taxpayer cannot 
comply with the technical requirements of section 7430.4& 
A. FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
The First Circuit, in Kaufman v. Egger,·9 held that preliti-
gation conduct may be considered by the court when assessing 
the reasonableness of the government's conduct. liD The court 
found that the government's conduct in dealing with the 
Kaufmans was unreasonable by any standard.IiI 
The government's initial contact with the Kaufmans was to 
send an audit notice to a former address approximately one year 
42. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
44. I.R.C. § 6212 (1986) requires that the Statutory Notice of Deficiency be sent to 
the taxpayer's last known address. See also M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, 10-12 - 10-13 (1981 & Supp. 1987). 
45. See generally text accompanying notes 52-56. 
46.Id. 
47. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
48. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (1986) requires that administrative remedies be exhausted 
before a taxpayer is eligible to recover costs under the section. 
49. 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985). 
50. Id. at 4. 
51. Id. 
8
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after they had moved.1I2 When the Kaufmans failed to appear at 
the audit, the IRS assessed a tax of $14,380.113 The IRS mailed 
both a Notice of Proposed Adjustment and the Statutory Notice 
of Deficiency to an address where the Kaufmans had never 
lived. II" In 1983, the IRS notified the Kaufmans that their 1982 
tax refund had been seized to pay some of the prior tax liabil-
ity.1I11 Subsequently, they received a notice instructing them to 
contact the local IRS to arrange for installment payments on 
their remaining liability.1I6 
Thereafter, the Kaufmans filed suit in the United States 
district court for injunctive relief and for the return of their 
1982 refund.1I7 Two months after the Kaufmans filed their suit, 
the IRS stipulated to the issuance of a permanent injunction 
prohibiting it from any further collection activity based on the 
invalidly issued Deficiency Notice.1I8 The district court awarded 
the Kaufmans attorneys' fees and the IRS appealed.1I9 
The First Circuit stated that the Kaufmans' situation was 
an example of the "unnecessary tribulations that can be brought 
to bear upon the unsuspecting citizenry by today's computerized 
bureaucracy."6o The court went on to make it clear that taxpay-
ers need not absorb the costs of initiating a suit that, but for the 
unreasonable conduct of the IRS, they would never have filed. 61 
52. [d. at 2. 
53. [d. 
54. [d. Eleven days later the IRS acknowledged its error and noted in the 
Kaufmans' file that the Statutory Deficiency Notice had been sent to the wrong address. 
During this same time, the IRS was corresponding with the Kaufmans at their correct 
address, on another unrelated tax matter. [d. at 2 n.2. This situation typifies the "last 
known address" case. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
55. Kaufman, 759 F.2d at 2. 
56. [d. 
57. [d. The government argued that the Kaufmans had failed to exhaust the admin-
istrative remedies provided by the IRS as required by § 7430(b)(2) (Supp. 1985) because 
they had immediately filed suit. [d. The court held that the Kaufmans were not pre-
cluded from receiving an award of costs, because the alleged deficiency had already been 
referred to collections. [d. at 3. Moreover, the court found that the Kaufmans fell within 
an exception to that requirement set forth in a treasury regulation (26 C.F.R. § 301.7430-
I-f(3)(ii)(1986)), and therefore the IRS, through its own regulations, exempted the 
Kaufmans from that requirement. Kaufman, 758 F.2d at 2-3. 
58. [d at 2. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. at 1. 
61. [d. at 1-2. "The present case zeros in on one of many unnecessary tribulations 
that can be brought to bear upon the unsuspecting citizenry by todays' computerized 
9
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The court stated that the intent of Congress in passing section 
7430 was, an attempt to "grant the public some relief from such 
bungling. "611 
The main issue before the court was whether the govern-
ment's behavior prior to the institution of litigation could be 
considered in determining the unreasonableness of its behavior 
in the section 7430 context. After acknowledging the split on the 
issue in the opinions to date, the First Circuit held that preliti-
gation conduct may be considered because "it is in keeping with 
Congress' remedial bias in enacting this statute."63 The court 
concluded that the district court did not err in scrutinizing the 
government's prelitigation conduct to determine its reasonable-
ness.64 While stating that the conduct of the IRS in the Kauf-
man case was "unreasonable by any standard, "611 the court did 
not articulate any definitive test for unreasonableness. Instead, 
the court simply stated that interpreting section 7430 in any 
other way would frustrate Congressional intent.66 Thus, the con-
trolling interpretation of section 7430 in the First Circuit is that 
taxpayer entitlement to fees is triggered by unreasonable IRS 
conduct, regardless of the stage in the proceedings.67 
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS 
The Fifth Circuit's entry into the section 7430 controversy 
came with Powell v. Commissioner.68 In Powell, the taxpayer re-
ceived an assessment on an uncontested 1976 liability with the 
understanding that collection would be curtailed until the audit 
of an underlying tax shelter was completed.69 To protect its po-
sition for the 1977 year, the IRS issued a statutory notice using 
an alternate theory with respect to the indebtedness connected 
with the tax shelter.70 Taxpayer filed a petition for the 1977 
year. Ultimately the parties settled the dispute for both the 1977 
bureaucracy." Kaufman, 758 F2d. at 1. 
62. Id. at 1·2. 
63. Id. at 4. 
64. Id. at 3. 
65. Id. at 4. 
66.Id. 
67.Id. 
68. 791 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1986). 
69. Id. at 386·87. 
70. Id. at 387. 
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and 1976 years by stipulating to a $15,000 deficiency for the 
1976 year and a dismissal of the 1977 case.71 Powell's position in 
seeking attorneys' fees was that the government was unreasona-
ble in issuing the 1977 statutory notice before he had an oppor-
tunity to address the 1976 settlement ofI'er.72 
The Fifth Circuit, analyzing section 7430 and analogizing its 
parallel EAJA provisions,7s held that the conduct of the IRS at 
the time the suit was filed should be examined to ascertain the 
reasonableness of the government's conduct.74 The test is in the 
nature of a proximate cause test.711 The court reasoned that if 
unreasonable IRS conduct proximately caused the taxpayer to 
file suit and if the other prerequisites of section 7430 were met, 
the taxpayer could recover fees. 76 The court went on to justify 
this perspective by stating that "[t]his reading of section 7430 
allows tax litigants to recover the costs of a civil proceeding they 
never should have been required to initiate."77 
The most intriguing part of the Fifth Circuit's opinion is its 
use of EAJA as an interpretative guide. The court began its 
comparison by noting that section 7430 "by and large places tax-
payers at a disadvantage. "76 The opinion went on to directly 
analogize to EAJA, despite its much lighter burden of proof on 
the citizen litigating against the government.79 The court rea-
soned that the shifting of the burden of proof to the taxpayer 
was enough of a disadvantage, making the additional disadvan-
tage of narrowly interpreting the language of the statute 
unnecessary.80 
In acknowledging the parallels between EAJA and section 
7430, the court reasoned that the legislative intent behind them 
was similar.81 It held that "Congress' retroactive interpretation 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 387-88. 
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982) (repealed 1984). 
74. Powell, 791 F.2d at 391-92. 
75. Id. at 388. 
76. Id. at 391-92. 
77. Id. at 392. 
78. Id. at 390. 
79. Id. at 390-91. 
80. Id. at 390. 
81. Id. at 390-91. 
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of the phrase ['position of the United States'] in EAJA should 
be equally applicable to section 7430, even though Congress 
amended only EAJA .... "82 
The Fifth Circuit formulated an appealing rationale for ex-
amining pre litigation conduct when awarding fees. It reasoned 
that if an administrative position adopted by the IRS forced a 
taxpayer to file an action, it would be incongruous for section 
7430 to require courts to ignore the unreasonable position un-
derlying the taxpayer's action.83 
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Powell is not as broad as the 
First Circuit's opinion in Kaufman. The Powell court saw a need 
to examine only the highest administrative position adopted by 
the government immediately prior to the filing of the taxpayer's 
suit.8• If that administrative position was unreasonable and 
proximately caused the litigation, then a court may award fees 
and costS. 811 
In contrast, the Kaufman court examined the conduct of 
the IRS throughout the administrative proceedings.86 It held 
that if the government's conduct was unreasonable, regardless of 
the stage in the proceedings, the taxpayer could recover fees. 87 
This holding ignores the legislature's obvious concern regarding 
the case load of the Tax Court.88 It also places an additional 
burden on the judiciary. Instead of merely scrutinizing the gov-
ernment's position immediately prior to the filing of the tax-
payer's action, courts in the First Circuit must study the admin-
istrative conduct of the IRS throughout the proceedings. 
82. [d. In 1985, Congress amended EAJA to make it clear that the "position of the 
United States" included "the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil 
action is based." Act of Aug. 5. 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D)(1987». 
83. Powell, 791 F.2d at 391. 
84. [d. at 392. 
85. [d. 
86. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67. 
88. See HR REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
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C. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS 
The Ninth Circuit recently took the opportunity to inter-
pret section 7430 in the case of Sliwa u. Commissioner.89 Sliwa 
was a last known address case90 where there was substantial le-
gal activity between the issuance of a first invalid notice of defi-
ciency, the issuance of a second, valid, notice of deficiency and 
the filing of a Tax Court petition.91 
After the petition was filed the case went to the Appeals 
Division for settlement negotiations.92 At a hearing in Septem-
ber of 1985 the Tax Court took Sliwa's request for formal dis-
covery under advisement.9s Thereafter the Commissioner con-
ceded all the issues in the case and, in November of 1985, 
stipulated to a dismissal of the Notice of Deficiency.9. Petitioner 
then requested that the court award litigation costs under sec-
tion 7430.911 The Tax Court denied the motion and Sliwa ap-
pealed.98 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, as a case 
of first impression regarding statutory interpretation.97 
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion with an overview of 
the other circuits' interpretations of the statute.98 After compar-
ing the reasoning behind the differing interpretations of the 
statute, the Ninth Circuit stated that a restrictive interpretation 
of the phrase "in the civil proceeding" would "undermin[e] the 
legislative intent ... "99 of the statute. 
The Ninth Circuit, like the Powell and Kaufman courts, 
held that prelitigation administrative conduct could be scruti-
nized for unreasonableness when determining whether or not to 
award fees against the government. IOO It reasoned that "[i]f the 
89. 839 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988). 
90. [d. at 603. 
91. [d. at 603-604. 
92. [d. at 604. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
o 95. [d. at 604-605. 
96., [d. at 605. 
97: [d. 
98. [d. at 606-607. 
99. [d. at 607. 
100. [d. 
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conduct of the government at later administrative levels is un-
reasonable, it stands to reason that the position of the govern-
ment in defending in the civil proceeding in the first place may 
be unreasonable as well if based upon that conduct."lol Signifi-
cantly, the Ninth Circuit echoed the Powell court's analysis re-
garding unreasonable administrative positions at higher levels. l02 
The statement above largely paraphrases the "proximate cause" 
analysis utilized in Powell. lOS If the government's unreasonable 
conduct causes a taxpayer to file suit, the government should be 
liable for the costs the taxpayer incurred in bringing that suit. l04 
An important distinction between the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Sliwa and the decisions in Kaufman and Powell is that 
the Ninth Circuit bifurcated the issues of reasonableness and fee 
recovery.101i The Ninth Circuit held that unreasonable conduct 
triggered the provisions of section 7430, regardless of the stage 
in the proceedings.loe However, the court also held that only the 
"costs and fees actually incurred in and after preparing and fil-
ing the petition in the tax court, were recoverable under the 
statute. "107 This distinction is significant, first, because it fulfills 
the goals set out in the legislative historyl08 and second, because 
it maintains the narrow focus of section 7430's statutory 
language.l09 
In a footnote,l1o the Ninth Circuit indicated that they be-
lieved that this interpretation of section 7430 was in accord with 
the amendment of section 7430 by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986.111 The court conceded that the 1986 amendment of section 
7430 did not control in Sliwa but stated that it "shed light" on 
the intent of Congress in passing the statute. ll2 Thus, the Ninth 
101. [d. 
102. [d. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
103. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
104. [d. See also Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. 
105. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. The court held that unreasonable administrative behav-
ior triggered cost recovery, but that only costs incurred in and after preparing the peti-
tion could be recovered. [d. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. 
108. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32. 
110. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607 n.6. 
111. [d. See also infra notes 182-189 and accompanying text. 
112. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607 n.6. 
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Circuit's interpretation of section 7430 should not change dra-
matically when applying the amended statute.1l3 
In contrast, the Kaufman and Powell courts did not deline-
ate the point at which taxpayers could recover fees for represen-
tation during the administrative process, if the position of the 
IRS was unreasonable.lH Both courts treated the reasonableness 
and threshold of recovery issues as a single issue.llII In doing so, 
they interpreted the statute very broadly, and failed to take into 
consideration the narrow focus of the statute's language. lIS The 
Ninth Circuit's decision adopts the analytical approach 
presented by the Fifth Circuit in Powell and refines it in an at-
tempt to comport with the statute's narrow language. ll7 
D. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS 
The District of Columbia interpreted section 7430 much 
more narrowly when it decided Baker v. Commissioner. us In 
Baker, the taxpayer, who worked in Saudi Arabia, was required 
to live in restricted quarters. ll9 Baker took an exclusion from his 
gross income for those quarters, as allowed by section 911 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.120 
In 1982, the IRS audited Baker's returns, along with those 
of two taxpayers in identical situations.121 The IRS disallowed 
Baker's exclusion, while dismissing the cases against the 
others.122 Baker informed the IRS of the identical cases and of 
their results.123 The Appeals Office denied that the outcome of 
the other identical cases had any bearing upon Baker's situa-
tion.124 Soon after Baker hired an attorney and filed a petition in 
113. Id. 
114. See, Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985) and Powell v. Commis-
sioner, 791 F.2d 385, 391-392 (5th Cir. 1986). 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67 and 83-85. 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32. 
117. Sliwa 839 F.2d at 607. 
118. 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
119. Id. at 638-39. 
120. Id. at 639. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 639-40. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 640. 
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Tax Court, the IRS signed a stipulation which acknowledged 
that its disallowance of Baker's exclusion was wrong.12& Baker 
then requested, pursuant to section 7430, that the Tax Court 
award him the costs he incurred in bringing his suit.126 
The District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit Court held that 
only the reasonableness of the "position of the United States in 
the civil proceeding [commenced by Baker's petition]" should be 
considered when deciding whether or not to award costS.127 The 
court concluded that the language and legislative history of sec-
tion 7430 both mandated that recovery of costs begin only after 
litigation had begun.128 
In reaching its conclusion the D.C. Circuit looked to EAJA 
for guidance in interpreting section 7430.129 Unlike the Fifth 
Circuit, however, this court distinguished EAJA, stating that the 
congressional amendment of EAJA in 1985, which broadened 
the language,130 evidenced the congressional intent that section 
7430 have "a focus narrower than EAJA's."131 The court then 
stated that it believed the test articulated in Spencer v. 
NLRB,132 ironically, an EAJA case, should guide the disposition 
of fees under section 7430.133 The Spencer test provides that 
when a petitioner has been subjected to atypically harsh treat-
ment, the government must produce a particularly strong justifi-
cation for its position.13• 
This test ignores the burden of proof requirement of section 
7430, which clearly places the taxpayer in the position of proving 
that the government's position was unreasonable.131i Thus in the 
D.C. Circuit, courts addressing fee awards in tax cases must de-
termine whether the taxpayer has been subjected to "atypically 
harsh treatment."136 If the court is satisfied that the IRS has 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. at 644. 
128. [d. at 641. 
129. [d. at 641-42. 
130. See supra note 82. 
131. Baker, 787 F.2d at 641-42 n.8. 
132. 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984). 
133. Baker, 787 F.2d at 643. 
134. [d. (citing Spencer, 712 F.2d at 561). 
135. Baker, 787 F.2d at 643. See also, LR.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985). 
136. Baker, 787 F.2d at 643 (citing Spencer, 712 F.2d at 561). 
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sufficiently abused the taxpayer, the burden to produce a "par-
ticularly strong" justification for its actions shifts to the govern-
ment.137 This analysis is quite unlike that used in any other ju-
risdiction for section 7430 questions. 
E. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS 
In Ewing v. Heye,t38 the Eleventh Circuit decided the case 
of a taxpayer who could not convince the IRS to release a lien.139 
The taxpayer had satisfied the obligation secured by the lien, 
but the government had not released it, despite the statutory 
requirement that such a lien be released within thirty days of 
satisfaction.l'o When the taxpayer filed suit, the government in-
vestigated its case and promptly conceded. l41 
The taxpayer then requested reimbursement for the costs 
incurred in both the administrative proceedings and in bringing 
its suit in the district court.142 The district court denied the tax-
payer's request because the government had acted reasonably 
since the petitioner filed his complaint.l43 It conceded its case. I .. 
The district court held that administrative proceedings were not 
the civil proceedings referenced by section 7430. IU 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the taxpayer conceded 
that "costs and attorneys [sic] fees may not be awarded for pre-
litigation administrative proceedings."l46 Therefore, the main is-
sue before the court of appeals should have been whether the 
district court properly found the in-court litigating posture of 
the IRS to be reasonable.m Instead, the court stated, "[t]he sole 
question before the court is whether the district judge correctly 
137. Id. 
138. 803 F.2d 613 (lIth Cir. 1986) 
139. Id. at 614. 
140. 26 U.S.C. § 6325{a){l) (1967 and Supp. 1987) (requiring that IRS liens be re-
leased within thirty days of satisfaction). 
141. Ewing, 803 F.2d at 614. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 614 n.l (citing Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-4). 
147. Id. 
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determined that the government's position in the administrative 
proceedings could not be examined to determine the reasonable-
ness of the government's position 'in the civil proceeding.' "148 
The court went on to discuss the differences in interpreta-
tion of section 7430 among the circuits. It concluded that "the 
denial of attorneys' fees and costs in the instant case may well 
be 'unfair,' "In but that nevertheless section "7430 as drafted by 
Congress, does not allow for such an award."lI1O The court held 
that they could not scrutinize administrative conduct occurring 
prior to the filing of a legal action or award fees incurred during 
such an administrative proceeding.lIil While this holding was un-
necessary to determine the issues presented in the case, it is 
nevertheless the controlling precedent for the Eleventh Circuit. 
The Ewing court criticized the Kaufman and Powell deci-
sions as attempts to judicially amend an imperfectly drafted 
statute.1112 While sympathetic to the plight of taxpayers forced 
into administrative appeals proceedings, the opinion states that 
"Congress would have been explicit if it had intended to provide 
attorney fee relief for proceedings prior to the 'civil proceed-
ings.' "l11S The opinion criticizes the analysis in Powell, stating 
that Powell's use of the 1985 amendment of EAJA to infer Con-
gressional intent that section 7430 apply to administrative pro-
ceedings was "totally unconvincing."1114 Yet, neither the Elev-
enth Circuit in Ewing nor the D.C. Circuit in Baker give a 
reasonable explanation as to how Congress expected to "deter 
abusive overreaching"lli1i by the IRS, if it also intended to limit 
awards of fees and costs to cases of in-court unreasonableness. 
III. ANAL YSIS 
The examples of unreasonable conduct outlined by Congress 
in its Committee Reports are much more likely to occur prior to 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 616. 
150. [d. 
151. [d. 615-16. 
152. [d. at 616. 
153. [d. at 615 (citing the district court order at 2-3). 
154. [d. 
155. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
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the filing of a suit.168 Nevertheless, the Eleventh and D.C. Cir-
cuits have been willing to abandon the goal of vindicating tax-
payers' rights and deterring IRS abuses167 by adhering to a strict 
interpretation of section 7430.168 They have largely ignored the 
the factors the committee suggested be taken into account when 
considering awarding fees,169 and have failed to explain how 
such factors might arise in an in-court proceeding. 
An additional question not dealt with by the Baker and Ew-
ing opinions is the language in the statute which immediately 
proceeds the controversial language "position of the United 
States in a civil proceeding."18o Section 7430(c)(2)(B)(3) states: 
"The term 'civil proceeding' includes a civil action."181 Both the 
Eleventh182 and D.C.183 Circuits seem to have assumed that 
"civil proceeding" was synonymous with "civil action." However, 
if the terms mean the same thing, it is somewhat odd for Con-
gress to have included them both. 
Another pertinent inquiry in this regard is, if a civil action 
is included within the term "civil proceeding," what else is in-
cluded in the term?184 Given the subsequent amendments to sec-
tion 7430 to further conform it to EAJA,t86 a persuasive argu-
ment could be made that Congress intended administrative 
proceedings to be included within the term civil proceeding. 
At the opposite extreme, the First and Fifth Circuits seem 
ready to ignore altogether the narrow language that Congress 
used to limit recovery under § 7430.188 The Ninth Circuit in 
156. See supra note 35. 
157. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 127-131 and 148-151. 
159. See supra note 35. 
160. I.R.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(B)(4) (Supp. 1985). 
161. I.R.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(B)(3) (Supp. 1985). 
162. Ewing, 803 F.2d at 615. 
163. Baker, 787 F.2d at 641-42. 
164. The following factors support the conclusion that the legislature intended that 
courts consider administrative conduct when deciding whether or not to award fees 
under § 7430: (1) the legislative goals of deterring abuse and overreaching by the IRS 
(see H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11); (2) the factors the committee suggested 
courts use when considering awarding fees under § 7430 (see supra note 35 and accom-
panying text); and (3) the subsequent amendment of section 7430 to bring its language 
closer to EAJA (see infra notes 183-190 and accompanying text). 
165. See supra notes 183-190. 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67 and 73-82. 
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Sliwa adopted the proximate cause reasoning of the Powell deci-
sion and then refined it to accommodate the narrow language of 
section 7430.167 By scrutinizing pre litigation conduct for reason-
ableness, the Ninth Circuit seeks to deter "abus[e] and over-
reaching" by the IRS.168 By only allowing recovery for those fees 
incurred in and after preparing the petition, they limit recovery 
as mandated by the statute's narrow language.189 
Congress passed section 7430 to give taxpayers a chance to 
vindicate their rights against the IRS170 and to deter IRS 
abuses. l7l However, they also drafted section 7430 in a way in-
tended to deter spurious taxpayer suits172 and to force taxpayers 
to utilize fully the administrative appeals procedures of the 
IRS.173 In so doing, Congress attempted to provide taxpayers 
who had been abused by the system, rather than merely incon-
venienced, with a way to vindicate their rights. Section 7430 was 
intended to eliminate the situation in which an innocent tax-
payer simply gives in and pays the deficiency because the ex-
pense of an appeal is more than the alleged deficiency.174 
It is unjust, regardless of the interpretation of section 7430, 
to allow the IRS to force a taxpayer to incur costs in the appeals 
process and then concede its case without liability immediately 
upon the filing of a legal action. Moreover, it is contrary to the 
stated legislative intent and the spirit of section 7430. Yet this is 
the conclusion reached by the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. For 
courts to read section 7430 in such a restricted manner is to en-
courage the very abuse and overreaching which Congress sought 
to deter by enacting the statute. 
The Sliwa opinion came the closest to balancing the sec-
tion's limiting language with its policy goals. 17II Unlike Kaufman, 
167. Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1988). 
168. Id. "If [§ 7430) is to have any bite at all, courts must be permitted to look to 
earlier conduct to determine whether the initial filing of a tax petition was provoked by 
unreasonable conduct." Id. 
169. Id. 
170. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 15. 
173. Id. at 13. 
174. See Schmalbeck & Myers, A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules Under The 
Internal Revenue Code, 1986 DUKE L.J. 970, 977-80 (1986). . 
175. Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra text accom-
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which broadly held that courts may consider all prelitigation ad-
ministrative conduct when deciding cost awards,I76 the Sliwa 
opinion, like the Powell opinion, focuses on what caused the tax-
payer to file suit. I77 Only the administrative conduct at the high-
est level, the level immediately prior to the filing of the suit, 
may be considered by the court.I78 If that conduct was unreason-
able and proximately caused the taxpayer to file suit, fees and 
costs incurred in preparing and filing the petition may be 
recovered. I79 
This analysis enables taxpayers who are subjected to unrea-
sonable conduct to file suit.I80 The proximate cause test may 
also deter abusive conduct by administrative officers. They may 
be encouraged to behave reasonably throughout the administra-
tive procedures because, in the event an innocent taxpayer does 
file suit, the courts will hold the IRS accountable for its 
conduct. I81 
IV. SECTION 7430 AS AMENDED BY THE 1986 TAX RE-
FORM ACT 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress attempted to rec-
tify section 7430's legislative shortcomings by amending those 
sub-sections which had been the subject of the most contro-
versy.I82 The first area of debate which Congress attempted to 
settle was the controversy surrounding the reasonableness 
panying notes 99-109. 
176. Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985). 
177. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. See also Powell, 791 F.2d at 391-92. 
178. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. See also, Powell, 791 F.2d at 392. 
179. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. See also Powell, 791 F.2d at 392. 
180. Thus, the taxpayer is allowed to approach the prospect of litigation with the 
IRS from a rational, moral aspect, rather than from a solely economic analysis. Id. at 
392. See also Langsraat, Collecting Attorney Fees From The Government In Tax Litiga-
tion: An Analysis of the Winners And Prospects For The Future, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395 
(1986) (discussing § 7430's effectiveness in compensating prevailing taxpayers). 
181. One criticism of the deterrent effects of § 7430 is that it does not hold individ-
ual agents, who abuse their administrative positions, economically liable for their ac-
tions. See Award Of Attorney's Fees In Tax Cases, 1985: Hearings Before The Sub-
comm. On Select Revenue Measures of the House of Representatives Comm. On Ways 
And Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) (statement of Andy Jacobs Jr., Congressional 
Rep. from Indiana). 
182. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1551, 100 Stat 2085, 2752-53 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 7430 (1987». 
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test.18S The test now, as provided in the amended section 
7430(c)(2)(A)(i) is whether the government's conduct was "sub-
stantially justified.1Il8' 
The difference between the terms "substantially justified" 
and "unreasonable" is largely one of degree. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit defined what constitutes 
"substantial justification" in Washington v. Heckler.18G The 
court stated, in the EAJA context, that to be substantially justi-
fied, one must prove: "(i) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts 
alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory it propounds; 
and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and 
the legal theory advanced."186 The legislative history of EAJA 
employs the same type of parallels when it states "The test of 
whether or not a Government action is substantially justified is 
essentially one of reasonableness.1Il87 The problem is that a posi-
tion can be reasonable, and still not be substantially justified by 
the circumstances. 
183. In the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress made four major changes in § 7430. 
First, Congress changed the standard by which the government's position is to be evalu-
ated. The former § 7430's previous language focused on whether the government's posi-
tion was reasonable, whereas the new provision focuses on whether the government's 
position was "substantially justified." I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985) amended by 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1511(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (1986). 
This language conforms with the corresponding language in EAJA, thus bolstering the 
arguments that § 7430 and EAJA are analogous and should be interpreted uniformly. 
Second, the administrative position taken by the IRS is now included in the evalua-
tion of whether the government's position was substantially justified. I.R.C. § 7430 
(c)(2)(A)(I) (1986). The statute's former language referred only to the government's "po-
sition ... in the civil proceeding," thus causing the controversy discussed supra. I.R.C. § 
7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (1985). 
Third, the maximum award for attorneys' fees has been set at $75 per hour and 
reimbursement for expert testimony and preparation of expert reports, tests, etc., must 
be based on market rates. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(I)(A)(ii)(I) (1986). The former maximum was 
set at $25,000 in total costs. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(I)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. 1985). 
Finally, Congress imposed net worth limitations on the parties who are eligible for 
fee reimbursements. Individuals having a net worth of less than $2,000,000 and entities 
having a net worth of less than $7,000,000 are eligible for reimbursements. Taxpayers 
with net worths over these amounts are not eligible for reimbursements. I.R.C. § 7430 
(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1986). 
184. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985) amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1511(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (1986). 
185. 756 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1985). 
186. [d. at 961. 
187. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4989. 
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The second area of confusion which Congress attempted to 
clarify was the meaning of the phrase "position of the United 
States in the civil proceeding.7!l88 The section was amended to 
state: "The term 'position of the United States' includes - (A) 
the position taken by the United States in the civil proceeding, 
and (B) any administrative action or inaction by the District 
Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service (and all subsequent ad-
ministrative action or inaction) upon which such proceeding is 
based. "189 
This language roughly corresponds with the parallel lan-
guage in EAJA, which was amended in 1985 by Congress to clar-
ify what it meant by the "position of the United States."190 It 
appears that Congress believed that adding similar language in 
section 7430 would clarify what "position of the United States in 
the civil proceeding" meant. Unfortunately, the injection of sub-
paragraph (B) and its language regarding the presence of the 
District Counsel clouds rather than clears the pre litigation con-
duct controversy. 
Upon examination, a serious flaw in the amendment lan-
guage becomes clear. Taxpayers, regardless of where they bring 
suit, must request fees and costs under section 7430.191 Yet, in 
district courts or the Claims Court, where taxpayers sue the gov-
ernment for refunds from the IRS, District Counsel never enters 
the case at all. The government is represented by the United 
States Attorneys Office. Therefore, a truly literal reading of sec-
tion 7430 would completely preclude district or Claims Court 
judges from awarding litigation costs in tax cases. 
It is, however, likely that Congress merely meant to use the 
presence of District Counsel as an example of the sort of preliti-
gation administrative conduct for which the IRS should be ac-
countable. In that case the word "includes" would be interpreted 
to mean "including, but not limited to." If that is the case, an 
analogy may be made to the position taken by the Fifth Circuit 
in Powell. 192 The Fifth Circuit held that the position adopted at 
188. 1.R.C. § 7430(c)(4) (1986). 
189. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B) (1986). 
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (Supp. 1987). 
191. See HR REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 13. 
192. Powell v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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the highest administrative level, the position which proximately 
caused the taxpayer to file the petition, was subject to scrutiny 
for reasonableness. le3 The actions of District Counsel in its final 
negotiations with the taxpayer are an excellent example of the 
sort of administrative conduct the Fifth Circuit describes in 
Powell. le• 
v. CONCLUSION 
When drafting section 7430, the legislature was attempting 
to balance two competing interests. First, the interest of taxpay-
ers in knowing that, in the event the IRS takes an unreasonable 
position regarding their tax liability, they can recover the costs 
of defending themselves. lell Second, the interest of the Tax 
Court and the IRS in discouraging spurious tax litigation and in 
encouraging taxpayers to utilize the administrative procedures 
of the IRS. l e6 Because of these competing interests, Congress al-
tered the language of EAJA, the model statute, to accommodate 
a narrower focus. Congress intended that it be more difficult for 
taxpayers to recover fees under section 7430 than it was under 
EAJA; it did not intend the narrower language to totally pre-
clude taxpayers from ever receiving an award of litigation 
costs.197 The D.C. and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals' inter-
pretation of section 7430 essentially allow such a result. 
Section 7430's language allows taxpayer litigants to believe 
that they will receive fees and costs if they prevail under the 
statute. Nevertheless, a strict interpretation of the statute essen-
tially precludes recovery. By allowing prelitigation administra-
tive conduct to go unmonitored, this interpretation renders moot 
the important policy goals of allowing innocent taxpayers to vin-
dicate their rights and of deterring governmental abuse and 
overreaching. les 
Congress, through drafting and amending section 7430 to 
correspond with EAJA, has consistently sought to implement 
193. [d. 
194. [d. 
195. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. at 14. 
198. [d. at 11. 
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them analogously.199 The only discernible difference between the 
two is section 7430's narrower scope.200 While EAJA clearly fa-
vors the citizen litigant, section 7430 denies awards of litigation 
costs unless the taxpayer has exhausted administrative remedies 
and has been abused by the system. The analysis used by the 
Ninth Circuit in Sliwa best balances the goals of discouraging 
spurious tax litigation and allowing taxpayers an opportunity to 
vindicate their rights if they are not liable. 
This is accomplished by first requiring that taxpayers ex-
haust the administrative appeals system of the IRS before initi-
ating a formal legal action.20l The second goal of allowing tax-
payers to vindicate their rights is aided by requiring that the 
governmental position which caused the taxpayer to file suit be 
"substantially justified."202 While requiring that governmental 
positions be substantially justified, rather than merely "reasona-
ble" as was required prior to the 1986 amendment, puts an addi-
tional burden on the administrative agents of the IRS: the fact 
that the taxpayer must prove that the position was not substan-
tially justified evens the balance. 
The analysis used in Sliwa is consistent with legislative in-
tent of section 7430 and with the spirit of the subsequent 
amendment of the statute. Additionally, it answers the question 
which the other Circuits left untouched. At what point in time 
after the government adopts a substantially unjustified position 
can a taxpayer rely on being awarded fees and costs under sec-
tion 7430? The Ninth Circuit in Sliwa clearly stated that section 
7430 mandated that only those costs incurred in and after pre-
paring and filing the petition were recoverable under the 
statute.203 
199. See H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 800-02, 799-802 (1986); S. REP. No. 
313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 197-99 (1986). 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 18-28. 
201. See I.R.C. § 7430 (b)(l) (1986). 
202. See I.R.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(A)(i) (1986). 
203. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. The Ninth Circuit heard the case of Sponza v. Commis-
sioner, No. 86-7432 (9th Cir. filed October 27, 1986), argued March 11, 1987 and, as of 
this writing, has not delivered its opinion. Sponza is another last known address case in 
which the IRS, after prolonged prelitigation administrative procedures, conceded the 
case soon after the taxpayer filed a petition in Tax Court. The Ninth Circuit may use 
Sponza to broaden their interpretation of section 7430 and actually delineate what ad-
ministrative conduct is unreasonable. 
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The analysis proposed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Sliwa comes closest to actually implementing both the 
letter of the law in section 7430 and the spirit in which the stat-
ute was drafted. This conclusion is strongly supported by the 
1986 Tax Reform Act amendment of section 7430 which used 
the administrative actions of District Counsel as one example of 
administrative level conduct for which the IRS should be held 
accountable. The 1986 amendments lend credibility to the con-
clusion that the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits were correct in 
interpreting section 7430 analogously with EAJA and in holding 
the IRS accountable for its administrative conduct. 
Dani Michele Miller* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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